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Abstract
We document that job polarization – contrary to the consensus – has started
as early as the 1950s in the US: middle-wage workers have been losing both in
terms of employment and average wage growth compared to low- and high-wage
workers. Given that polarization is a long-run phenomenon and closely linked to
the shift from manufacturing to services, we propose a structural change driven
explanation, where we explicitly model the sectoral choice of workers. Our sim-
ple model does remarkably well not only in matching the evolution of sectoral
employment, but also of relative wages over the past fifty years.
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1 Introduction
The polarization of the labor market is a widely documented phenomenon in the US
and several European countries since the 1980s.1 This phenomenon, besides the rel-
ative growth of wages and employment of high-wage occupations, also entails the
relative growth of wages and employment of low-wage occupations compared to
middle-wage occupations. The leading explanation for polarization is the routiniza-
tion hypothesis, which relies on the assumption that information and computer tech-
nologies (ICT) substitute for middle-skill and hence middle-wage (routine) occupa-
tions, whereas they complement the high-skilled and high-wage (abstract) occupa-
tions (Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Autor and
Dorn (2013), Feng and Graetz (2014), Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014), Michaels,
Natraj, and Van Reenen (2014)).
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we document a set of facts which
raise flags that routinization driven by ICT, although certainly playing a role from the
1980s onwards, might not be the only driving force behind this phenomenon. Second,
based on these facts we propose a novel perspective on the polarization of the labor
market, one based on structural change.
Our analysis of US data for the period 1950-2007 reveals some novel facts.2 First,
we document that polarization defined over occupational categories both in terms of
employment and wages has been present in the US since the 1950s, which is long be-
fore ICT could have played a role. Second, we show that at least since the 1960s the
same patterns for both employment and wages are discernible in terms of three broad
sectors: low-skilled services, manufacturing and high-skilled services. Moreover, we
confirm previous findings that a significant part of the observed occupational employ-
ment share changes are driven by sectoral employment shifts. Additionally we show
that sectoral effects contribute significantly to occupational wage changes. Therefore
understanding the sectoral labor market trends is important even for the occupational
1See for example Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) and Autor and Dorn (2013) for the US, Goos
and Manning (2007) for the UK, Spitz-Oener (2006) and Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Scho¨nberg (2009) for
Germany, Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2009, 2014) for Europe.
2Analyzing the data until more recent years does not affect our findings; we chose 2007 as the final
year to exclude the potential impact of the financial crisis.
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trends.
Based on these facts, we propose a structural change driven explanation for these
sectoral labor market trends. We introduce a Roy-type selection mechanism (Roy
(1951)) into a multi-sector growth model, where each sector values a specific skill.
Individuals, who are heterogeneous along a range of skills, optimally select which
sector to work in. As long as the goods produced by the different sectors are com-
plements, a change in relative productivities increases labor demand in the relatively
slow growing sectors, and wages in these sectors have to increase in order to attract
more workers.
In particular we assume that there are three types of consumption goods: low-end
service, manufacturing and high-end service goods.3 We break services into two as
they comprise of many different subsets, e.g. dry cleaners vs. banking, which seem
hardly to be perfect substitutes in consumption, as would be implied by having a
single service consumption in households’ preferences. In our model, we therefore
treat low- and high-end services as being just as substitutable with each other as they
are with manufacturing goods.
A change in relative productivities does not only affect relative supply, but through
prices it also affects relative demand. Given that goods and the two types of services
are complements, as relative labor productivity in manufacturing increases, labor has
to reallocate from manufacturing to both service sectors. To attract more workers into
both low- and high-skilled services, their wages have to improve relative to manufac-
turing. Since in the data we see that manufacturing jobs tend to be in the middle of
the wage distribution, this mechanism leads to a pattern of polarization in terms of
sectors, which is driven by the interaction of supply and demand for sectoral output.
We calibrate themodel to quantitatively assess the contribution of structural change
– driven by unbalanced technological progress – to the polarization of wages and em-
ployment. Taking measured labor productivity growth from the data and using exist-
ing estimates for the elasticity of substitution between sectors, we find that our model
3Buera and Kaboski (2012) also split services into low- and high-skilled: their selection is based on
the fraction of college educated workers in the industry. Their main interest is linking the rising skill
premium to the increasing share of services in value added, and they emphasize the home vs market
production margin. Our focus is very different: sectoral wages.
3
predicts between 33 and 59 per cent of the relative average wage gain of high- and
low-skilled services compared to manufacturing, and between 62 and 99 per cent of
the change in employment shares. For this exercise, we quantify the adjustment of la-
bor productivity growth needed to correct for selection effects in the calibrated model.
Without these adjustments, productivity growth is understated in the expanding sec-
tors, and is overstated in the shrinking sector; according to our model this would lead
to an overstatement of annual productivity growth rate differentials by between 27
and 35 per cent.
This paper builds on and contributes to the literature both on polarization and
on structural change. To our knowledge, these two phenomena until now have been
studied separately.4 However, according to our analysis of the data, polarization of
the labor market and structural change are closely linked to each other, and according
to our model, industrial shifts can lead to polarization.5 Our theory highlights a par-
ticular connection between structural change and occupational structure. Structural
change leads to the sector with the highest productivity growth to shrink in terms of
employment, and to experience lower wage growth than the other sectors of the econ-
omy; the occupation which is used the most intensively in this sector also experiences
employment and wage losses. In the period 1950 to 2007 around half of routine em-
ployment was in the manufacturing sector (and around 80 per cent of manufacturing
hours were in routine jobs). Thus when manufacturing started to shrink after 1950,
this led to a “hollowing out” pattern, as routine workers were in the middle both in
terms of skills and wages.
The structural change literature has documented for several countries that as in-
come increases employment shifts away from agriculture and from manufacturing to-
wards services, and expenditure shares follow similar patterns (Kuznets (1957), Mad-
dison (1980), Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014)). In particular the employ-
ment and expenditure share of manufacturing has been declining since the 1950/60s
4Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Goos et al. (2014) look at the contribution of between-industry
shifts to the polarization of occupational employment, but do not analyze the effect of structural change
on the polarization of the labor market.
5While we focus in the main text on the link between industrial and occupational structure since
1950/1960, we show in Appendix A.10 using data over 1850–1940 that there is a close connection also
over much longer time series, see Figure 16 and Table 13.
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in the US, while those in services have been increasing. From an empirical perspec-
tive, we add to this literature by documenting that in the US the employment pat-
terns are mimicked by the path of relative average wages. The economic mechanisms
put forward in the literature for structural transformation combine specific features
of preferences with some form of technological progress. Some papers assume non-
homothetic preferences, such that changes in aggregate income – coming from tech-
nological progress – lead to a reallocation of employment across sectors (Kongsamut,
Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Boppart (2014)). Other papers focus on differential total factor
productivity (TFP) growth across sectors (Ngai and Pissarides (2007)) or on changes in
the supply of an input used by different sectors with different intensities (Caselli and
Coleman (2001), Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)).
We build on the model of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) closely, with one important
modification: we explicitly model sectoral labor supply. As our goal is to study the
joint evolution of employment and wages, we introduce heterogeneity in workers’
skills, who endogenously sort into different sectors. In order to meet increasing labor
demands in certain sectors – driven by structural change – the relative wages of those
sectors have to increase. Since we model the sector of work choice, we can analyze the
effects of structural change on relative sectoral wages, which is not common in models
of structural change.6 Another modification of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) is that we do
not model capital, as our interest is in the heterogeneity of labor supply. The change in
relative sectoral labor productivity can be driven by differential sectoral TFP changes
or by capital accumulation and different sectoral capital intensities.7 We stay agnostic
about the origin of the differential labor productivity growth across sectors. As Goos
et al. (2014) point out it is possible that part of this since the 1980s or 1990s is driven by
different routine intensities and ICT. While the spread of ICT is not likely to be driving
the differential sectoral productivity growth pre-1980, other forms of mechanization
could have had a stronger impact in the manufacturing sector than in services over
the longer time horizon that we study.
Ours is not the first paper to consider sectoral choice in a model of structural
6A notable exception is Caselli and Coleman (2001).
7For example if ICT is usedmore intensively in the manufacturing sector, and ICT becomes cheaper,
then this would show up as an increase in the relative productivity of manufacturing workers.
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change. The setup of Matsuyama (1991) is similar, where agents have different ef-
ficiencies across sectors, but focuses on the theoretical possibility of multiplicity of
stationary steady states. Caselli and Coleman (2001) study the role of falling costs of
education in the structural shift from agriculture to manufacturing, and they derive
predictions about the relative wages in the farm and non-farm sector. Focusing on
cross-country differences, Lagakos and Waugh (2013) show that self-selection can ac-
count for gaps in productivity and wages between agriculture and non-agriculture.
Buera and Kaboski (2012) analyze the relation between the increasing value added
share of the service sector and the increasing skill premium, without exploring their
model’s implications for sectoral employment or wages, whereas this is the focus of
our paper.
The polarization literature typically focuses on employment and wage patterns af-
ter the 1980s or 1990s. We contribute to this literature by documenting that in the US
the polarization of occupations in terms of wages and employment has started as early
as the 1950s. As mentioned before, the leading explanation is routinization linked to
ICT. While the spread of ICT is a convincing explanation for the polarization of la-
bor markets after the mid-1980s, it does not provide an explanation for the patterns
observed earlier.8 But it is conceivable that similar factors, not linked to ICT, but to
other forms of mechanization might have contributed to polarization earlier. Another
explanation suggested in the literature are consumption spillovers. This argument
suggests that as the income of high-earners increases, their demand for low-skilled
service jobs increases as well, leading to a spillover to the lower end of the wage dis-
tribution (Manning (2004), Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013)). We do not incorporate such
a mechanism in our model, as we strive for the most parsimonious setup featuring
structural change, which does a good job in replicating the basic sectoral labor market
facts since the 1960s.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 lays out our empirical
findings, section 3 our theoretical model, section 4 the quantitative results, and section
8Another explanation is the increasing off-shorability of tasks (rather than finished goods), as first
emphasized by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). It has been argued that it is largely the middle-
earning jobs that are off-shorable, but the evidence is mixed (Blinder (2009), Blinder and Krueger (2013),
Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). Just as for the ICT routinization hypothesis, this mechanism could have
explanatory power from the 1980s onwards.
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5 concludes.
2 Polarization in the data
Using US Census data between 1950 and 2000 and the 2007 American Community
Survey (ACS), we document the following three facts: 1) polarization in terms of oc-
cupations – contrary to the consensus – started as early as the 1950/60s, 2) wages and
employment have been polarizing in terms of broadly defined industries as well, 3)
a significant part of employment and wage polarization in terms of occupations is
driven by industry level changes. The focus of our quantitative model is fact 2). We
document fact 1) as most of the literature documents polarization in terms of occu-
pations. The employment part of fact 3) has been documented in the literature using
shift-share decompositions (Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Goos et al. (2014)), here we
confirm it for our classification, data, and time horizon. We also conduct a similar de-
composition for wages and show that a significant part of relative occupational wage
changes are driven by industry effects. We report fact 3) to convince the reader whose
main interest is in occupations, that for the full picture one needs to consider industries
as well. In what follows we document each of these facts in detail.
2.1 Polarization in terms of occupations
In the empirical literature, polarization is mostly represented in terms of occupations.
We document polarization in terms of two occupational classifications: we start from
the finest balanced occupational codes possible, and then go to ten broad occupational
categories.
Following themethodology used inAutor et al. (2006), Acemoglu andAutor (2011),
and Autor and Dorn (2013), we plot the smoothed changes in log real wages and em-
ployment shares for occupational percentiles, where occupations are ranked accord-
ing to their 1980 mean hourly wages.9 The novelty in these graphs is that we show
9We split occupations into 100 groups, each representing 1 percent of employment in 1980. We
smooth changes in log real hourly wages and employment shares with a locally weighted regression
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Figure 1: Smoothed changes in wages and employment
Notes: The data is taken from IPUMS US Census data for 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and the
American Community Survey (ACS) for 2007. The sample excludes agricultural occupations/industries
and observations with missing wage data; the details are given in Appendix A. Balanced occupation
categories (183 of them) were defined by the authors based on Meyer and Osborne (2005), Dorn (2009)
and Autor and Dorn (2013). The horizontal axis contains occupational skill percentiles based on their
1980 mean wages (see Appendix A for details). In the left panel the vertical axis shows for each occupa-
tional skill percentile the 30-year change in log hourly real wages, whereas in the right panel it shows
the 30-year change in employment shares (calculated as hours supplied).
these patterns going back until 1950, rather than focusing only on the post-1980 pe-
riod.10 In both graphs, each of the four curves represent changes which occurred over
a different 30-year period. The left panel in Figure 1 shows that there has been po-
larization in terms of real wages in all 30-year periods, since the real wage change is
larger for low- and for high-ranked occupations than it is for middle-ranked occupa-
tions. The polarization of real wages is most pronounced in the first two 30-year inter-
vals, but it is clearly discernible in the following ones as well from the slight U-shape
of the smoothed changes. The right panel shows the smoothed employment share
changes. The picture shows that employment did not move monotonically towards
higher-wage occupations, instead it seems that middle-earning occupations lost the
most in terms of employment. Thus employment polarization is present in the sense
that the employment share in low- and high-wage occupations increased more (or de-
creased less) than in middle-wage occupations. Polarization in terms of employment
is most pronounced in the last 30 years (1980-2007), but it seems to be present even in
10For comparability with the literature, we rank occupations based on their mean hourly wage in
1980. However, given that we look at a longer horizon than most of the literature, we also plot these
changes against a different ranking of occupations, one based on the 1950 mean hourly real wages. The
patterns look the same, see Figure 10 and the discussion in Appendix A.
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the earlier periods.11
We focus on 30-year windows for two reasons. First, most of the literature docu-
ments polarization over periods longer than two decades. Second, we link polariza-
tion to structural change, which is a long-run phenomenon. One concern with show-
ing 30-year windows, as in Figure 1, is that they stay silent on the exact timing of when
polarization started. To address this, we show the decade-by-decade version of this in
Figure 11 in Appendix A. This figure shows that these patterns do not necessarily hold
for a decade-by-decade analysis, neither in the earlier nor in the later part of the sam-
ple. In some decades the top gains, whereas in others the bottom gains, but it is never
the middle that grows the most in terms of employment shares.12 However, between
1960 and 1970 there is clear evidence of polarization, therefore the early polarization
patterns in the 30-year windows are not solely driven by changes after 1980.
A set of balanced occupational categories is needed to generate Figure 1. Meyer
and Osborne (2005) develop a set of harmonized occupational codes for the 1950 to
2000 Census and the ACS data. Dorn (2009) aggregates Meyer and Osborne (2005)
to achieve the finest possible balanced set of categories from 1980 onward. We base
our categories on Meyer and Osborne (2005) and Dorn (2009) to similarly achieve the
finest possible balanced set of occupations from 1950 onward. One concern with this
approach is that despite the efforts of these authors, their harmonized and/or balanced
categories are not truly comparable across Census years, and the reader might worry,
that looking at a longer horizon, as we do, only exacerbates this problem. However,
the biggest change in occupational classification occurred with the implementation of
the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) based occupation codes in the 2000
Census, when the hierarchical structure of occupational codes was drastically mod-
ified. While in previous Census years certain smaller occupation categories disap-
peared or entered, the main structure of occupations remained the same. 13 Therefore
11When ranking occupations in terms of the 1950, i.e. the initial, wage distribution, as is commonly
done in this literature, employment polarization is much more noticeable since the 1960s, see Figure 10
in Appendix A.
12The fact that over 10-year windows the polarization patterns do not hold for a very fine classifi-
cation of occupations is in line with the evidence in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), see their Figure 10.
Nonetheless, with a coarser classification of occupations, one sees polarization decade-by-decade, see
Figure 2.
13See the documentation of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) Census data.
9
looking at longer horizons does not worsen the comparability issue relative to existing
literature which typically focuses on the post-1980 period.
Nonetheless, to minimize the comparability issues of fine occupational categories
arising from the reclassifications across Census years, we aggregate up these fine cat-
egories to a coarser set of occupations. For these coarser categories there is less of a
concern about the consistency over time. The bar charts in Figure 2 show for ten broad
occupational groups percentage changes in total hours worked and in the mean log
wages over ten year intervals. This categorization follows Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
who showwith this methodology the employment changes post 1980. We follow their
ranking of occupations: the right three groups are the most educated and highest paid
occupations, the four in the middle are middle-skilled, while the three on the left are

















































Figure 2: Polarization in broad occupational categories
Notes: These bar graphs show for ten broad occupational categories, as defined in Acemoglu and Autor
(2011), the decade-by-decade percentage change in hours worked (left panel) and in themean logwages
(right panel).
We expand on Acemoglu and Autor (2011) in two ways: 1) by showing the trends
in decennial employment growth from 1950 onwards (in the left panel), and 2) by also
showing wage growth (right panel). While over 1950–1960, there is no clear pattern
in the employment growth of these broad occupational categories, from 1960 onwards
there is a U-shaped pattern. Total hours worked grew by more for occupations at the
higher and at the lower end of the skill distribution than for those in the middle. A
similar pattern is evident in the wage growth rates. Over each ten year period, wage
growth was the lowest in middle-skilled occupations. We conclude that even when
grouping occupations into broad categories following the methodology of Acemoglu
10
and Autor (2011), there is evidence of employment and wage polarization as early as
1960.14
2.2 Polarization in terms of sectors
Next we document the polarization of employment and wages in terms of three broad
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Figure 3: Polarization for broad industries
Notes: The data used is the same as in Figure 1. Each worker is classified into one of three sectors based
on their industry code (for details of the industry classification see text and Appendix A.2). The left
panel shows relative wages: the high-skilled service and the low-skilled service premium compared to
manufacturing (and their 95% confidence intervals), implied by the regression of log wages on gender,
race, a polynomial in potential experience, and sector dummies. The right panel shows employment
shares, calculated in terms of hours worked. The dashed vertical line represents 1960, from when on
manufacturing employment has been contracting.
Our classification for the manufacturing sector includes also mining and construc-
tion, as is common in the structural change literature (e.g. Herrendorf, Rogerson, and
Valentinyi (2013)). As mentioned in the introduction, we split the remaining (service)
industries into two categories based on consumption side considerations: within sec-
tors the industries should be close substitutes, whereas across sectors they should be
complements. The categorization is also guided by differences on the production side;
in low-end services workers have much less education and earn much lower wages
than in high-end services. For this reason we refer to them as low-skilled and high-
14In Figure 12 in Appendix A, we document polarization in terms of occupations in an even coarser
classification. Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we classify occupation groups into three cate-
gories: manual, routine, and abstract. Again, we find that the middle earning group, the routine work-
ers, lost both in terms of relative average wages and employment share to the benefit of manual and
abstract workers.
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skilled services.15 As a result of the combined production and consumption side con-
siderations we classify as low-end services the following industries: personal services,
entertainment, low-skilled transport, low-skilled business and repair services, retail
trade, and wholesale trade. High-end services comprise of professional and related
services, finance, insurance and real estate, communications, high-skilled business ser-
vices, utilities, high-skilled transport, and public administration.
Figure 3 documents the patterns of polarization both in terms of employment shares
and wages for the above defined sectors between 1950/1960 and 2007. The right panel
shows the path of employment shares: high-skilled services increase continuously,
low-skilled services increase and manufacturing decreases from 1960 onwards.16 In
terms of wages, we plot the sector premium in high-skilled and low-skilled services
compared to manufacturing, as well as their 95 percent confidence intervals. These
sector premia are the exponents of the coefficients on sector dummies, which come
from a regression of log wages where we control also for gender, race, and a polyno-
mial in potential experience.17 We plot these rather than the relative average wages,
because in our quantitative exercise we do not aim to explain sectoral wage differen-
tials that are potentially caused by age, gender or racial composition differences and
the differential path of these across sectors.18 As the graph shows, low-skilled service
workers earn less, whereas high-skilled service workers earn more than manufactur-
ing workers. Since the 1960s both low- and high-skilled service workers have been
gaining in terms of wages compared to manufacturing workers.19 To summarize, from
1960 onwards there is clear polarization in terms of these three sectors: the low- and
high-skilled service workers gained in terms of employment and wages at the expense
15See Figure 3, as well as Figure 13 and Table 5 in Appendix A.
16Between 1950 and 1960 manufacturing employment increased, and low-skilled service employ-
ment fell.
17See Table 6 in Appendix A.3 for details of the regression.
18One might be concerned that the employment share changes are driven by changes in the age,
gender, or race composition of the labor force. To assess this, we generate counterfactual industry
employment shares by fixing the industry employment share of each age-gender-race cell at its 1960
level, and allowing the employment shares of the cells to change. This exercise confirms that to a large
extent the employment share changes are not driven by the compositional changes of the labor force.
See Figure 14 in Appendix A.5.
19These trends are very robust, they hold in the raw data (see the left panel in Figure 13 in Appendix
A.3) as well as when constructing the sector premia using different specifications of the log wage re-
gression (see Table 8 in Appendix A.4).
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of the middle-earning, middle-skilled, manufacturing workers.
2.3 Polarization across occupations linked to industry shifts
To quantify the contribution of sectoral employment shifts to each occupation’s em-
ployment share path, we conduct a standard shift-share decomposition.20 The over-
all change in the employment share of occupation o between year 0 and t, ∆Eot =












where λoit = Loit/Lit denotes the share of occupation o, industry i employment within
industry i employment at time t, Eit = Lit/Lt denotes the share of industry i employ-
ment within total employment at time t, ∆ denotes the change between period 0 and
t, and the variables without a time subscript denote the average of the variable be-
tween period 0 and period t. ∆EBo represents the change in the employment share of
occupation o that is attributable to changes in industrial composition, i.e. structural
transformation, while ∆EWo reflects changes driven by within sector forces.
Table 1 shows for three broad occupational categories the total employment share
change and its decomposition between 1950 or 1960 and 2007 into a between-industry
and a within-industry component. We use either 3 occupational and 3 sectoral cate-
gories, or similarly to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), 10 occupations and 11 industries
to be sure that our results are not driven by the coarse categorization. This decompo-
sition indicates that a significant part of the occupational employment share changes
are driven by shifts in the industrial composition of the economy between 1950 and
2007. Between-industry shifts are the most important in manual occupations, and the
least important in abstract occupations, where they still account for at least a quarter
of the total change.
The magnitude of the role of between-industry shifts in our analysis is similar to
20An alternative way is to calculate how much occupational employment shares would have
changed, if industry employment shares would have remained at their 1960 level. See Figure 15 in
Appendix A.6.
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Table 1: Decomposition of changes in occupational employment shares
Employment shares
3 x 3 10 x 11
1950-2007 1960-2007 1950-2007 1960-2007
Manual
Total ∆ 2.98 5.68 2.98 5.68
Between ∆ 2.30 3.07 3.13 4.38
Within ∆ 0.67 2.61 -0.15 1.30
Routine
Total ∆ -19.79 -19.14 -19.79 -19.14
Between ∆ -5.66 -6.32 -9.73 -10.01
Within ∆ -14.13 -12.82 -10.06 -9.13
Abstract
Total ∆ 16.81 13.46 16.81 13.46
Between ∆ 3.35 3.24 6.60 5.63
Within ∆ 13.46 10.21 10.21 7.83
Notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change,
the second the between-industry component, and the third the within-industry component over the
period 1950 or 1960 to 2007. The first two columns use 3 occupations and 3 sectors, the last two use
10 occupations and 11 industries. The 10 occupations are the same as in Figure 2, while the 11 indus-
tries are: 1 personal services; entertainment and low-skilled business and service repairs, 2 low-skilled
transport, 3 retail trade, 4 wholesale trade, 5 extractive industries, 6 construction, 7 manufacturing,
8 professional and related services and high-skilled business services, 9 finance, insurance, and real
estate, 10 high-skilled transport and public utilities (incl. communications), 11 public administration.
that in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Goos et al. (2014).21 Goos et al. (2014) argue
that part of the between-industry shifts can be driven by routinization, which is a
within-industry phenomenon. Since routinization has a bigger impact on industries
where routine labor is usedmore intensively, employmentmight shift away from these
industries. While this is a valid concern, routinization, linked to ICT, is not likely to
be driving the faster productivity growth observed between the 1950s and 1980s. We
also conduct an alternative shift-share decomposition where we use sectoral value
added shares instead of sectoral employment shares. Even though the importance of
the between industry component is somewhat smaller than in the standard shift-share
21Acemoglu and Autor (2011) use US Census data between 1960 and 2000, and the ACS 2008 data.
Their focus is the declining importance of between-industry shifts from 1960-1980 to 1980-2007. We
find some support for this in our decade-by-decade analysis shown in Table 9 in Appendix A.6. The
relatively smaller contribution of between-industry shifts in later periods might be due to routiniza-
tion kicking in after the 1980s, thus providing an extra force for within-industry reallocation of labor.
Nonetheless, we find that even in the 1980-2007 period, between-industry shifts explain a significant
part of occupational employment share changes. Goos et al. (2014) use data for 16 European countries
between 1993 and 2010, and attribute a roughly equal role to between and within industry shifts in all
occupations.
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decomposition, it is nonetheless a substantial share of the overall change.22
We also decompose relative occupational wage changes into an occupation driven
component and an industry driven component. We define the relative average wage
of occupation o as the ratio of the occupation’s average wage relative to the average














where χiot = Liot/Lot is employment in industry i and occupation o in period t relative
to employment in occupation o in period t, rwit = wit/wrt is the ratio of the average
wage in industry i in period t relative to the average wage of routine occupations in
period t, and piot = wiot/wit is the premium of occupation o in industry i in period t.
In this three-way decomposition, the industry effect is itself composed of two parts: the
first part captures changes coming from workers within an occupation moving across
industries with different wages (Liot/Lit). The second part captures that each indus-
try’s relative average wage path (wit/wrt) influences the overall relative average wage
of the occupation. The occupation effect is driven by the change in the occupational
premium within each industry (wiot/wit).
Table 2 shows the change in manual and abstract wages relative to routine wages,
and their decomposition into an industry and an occupation component, between 1950
or 1960 and 2007. This Table confirms that both manual and abstract occupations have
been gaining in terms of wages relative to routine jobs. The decomposition shows
that between half and two thirds of the gain in relative manual wages is driven by
industry effects, by the reallocation of manual labor to higher-paying industries, or by
faster wage growth in industries where more manual workers are employed. For the
increase in relative abstract wages the results are even more striking: all of the gain is
driven by industry effects.24
22See Appendix A.7 for details.
23It is clear that the wage has to be a relative wage, otherwise the decomposition picks up the general
upward trend in wages, and assigns it to the component which includes a wage change. Since we are
interested in the path of manual and abstract wages relative to routine wages, it is natural to normalize
by the average wage in routine occupations.
24In general there are three ways of conducting a three-way decomposition depending on which
element one separates first. The other decompositions give virtually the same results, see Appendix
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Table 2: Decomposition of changes in relative occupational wages
Relative wages
3 x 3 10 x 11
1950-2007 1960-2007 1950-2007 1960-2007
Manual/Routine
Total ∆ 0.289 0.310 0.289 0.310
Industry ∆ 0.180 0.148 0.225 0.218
Occupation ∆ 0.108 0.162 0.064 0.093
Abstract/Routine
Total ∆ 0.327 0.240 0.327 0.240
Industry ∆ 0.310 0.254 0.376 0.317
Occupation ∆ 0.016 -0.014 -0.050 -0.077
Notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change,
the second the industry component, and the third the occupation component over the period 1950
or 1960 to 2007. The first two columns use 3 occupations and 3 sectors, columns three and four 10
occupations and 11 industries.
To summarize, first we document that polarization defined over occupational cat-
egories both in terms of employment and wages has been present in the US since
the 1950s. Second we show that the same patterns are discernible in terms of three
broad sectors: low-skilled services, manufacturing and high-skilled services. Finally,
we show that over the last six decades a significant amount of the employment share
changes and relative wage changes in occupations are driven by the (employment)
shifts across industries.
In the remainder of the paper we present a simple model of sorting and structural
change to jointly explain the sectoral shifts in employment and the changes in average
sectoral wages. We then calibrate the model to quantitatively assess how much of the
polarization of sectoral employment and wages it can explain over the last fifty years,
when feeding in sectoral labor productivity from the data.
3 Model
In order to illustrate the mechanism that is driving the polarization of wages and em-
ployment, we present a parsimonious static model, and analyze its behavior as pro-
ductivity levels increase across sectors. The key novel feature of our model is that
A.8. The decomposition of the decade-by-decade wage changes shows broadly similar patterns, see
Table 12 in Appendix A.9.
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we assume that each sector values different skills in its production process. Relaxing
the assumption of the homogeneity of labor allows us to derive predictions, not only
about the employment and expenditure shares, but also about the relative average
wages across sectors over time.
We assume that the economy is populated by heterogeneous agents, who all make
individually optimal decisions about their sector of work. Every individual chooses
their sector of work to maximize wages, in a Roy-model type setup. We assume that
individuals are ex ante heterogeneous in their efficiency units of labor in low-skilled
services, manufacturing and high-skilled services, and thus endogenously sort into
the sector where the return to their labor is the highest.
Furthermore these individuals are organized into a stand-in household, which
maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint.25 Households derive utility from
consuming high- and low-skilled services and manufacturing goods.
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium at all times: individuals make sec-
toral choices to maximize their wages, the stand-in household collects all wages and
maximizes its utility by optimally allocating this income between low-skilled services,
manufacturing goods and high-skilled services. Production is perfectly competitive,
wages and prices are such that all markets clear. We analyze the qualitative and quan-
titative role of technological progress in explaining the observed sectoral wage and
employment dynamics since the 1960s.
3.1 Sectors and production
There are three sectors in the model: high-skilled services (H), manufacturing (M ),
and low-skilled services (L). All goods and services are produced under perfect com-
petition, and each sector uses only labor as an input into production.
The technology to produce in each sector is:
Yj = AjNj for j ∈ {L,M,H}, (2)
25Wemake the assumption of a stand-in household purely for expositional purposes. Given that the
preferences we use are homothetic (see section 3.2.2), the resulting sectoral demands are equal to the
aggregation of individual demands.
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where Aj is productivity and Nj is the total amount of efficiency units of labor (effi-
ciency labor for short) hired in sector J for production. Sector J firms are price takers,
therefore the equilibrium wage per efficiency unit of labor (unit wage for short) in this




= pjAj for j ∈ {L,M,H}. (3)
Note that the wage of a worker with a efficiency units of sector J labor when working
in sector J is aωj .
3.2 Labor supply and demand for goods
The stand-in household consists of a measure one continuum of different types of
members. Each member chooses which one of the three market sectors to supply his
one unit of raw labor in. The household collects the wages of all its members and de-
cides how much low-skilled services, manufacturing goods and high-skilled services
to buy on the market.
3.2.1 Sector of work
We assume that every member of the household works full time in one of the three
market sectors. Since every member can work in any of the three sectors, and each
member’s utility is increasing in his own wages (as well as in all other members’
wages), it is optimal for each worker to choose the sector which provides him with
the highest wages.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their endowment of efficiency units of labor, a ∈
R
3
+, which is drawn from a time invariant distribution f(a). This is an innate ability
distribution, and as such is prior to any form of human capital that a worker might
accumulate, for example by acquiring education. Even though we do not model this
explicitly, one could think of our model as having a reduced-form educational choice
in the following sense. If a worker given their ability selects a sector, say H , to work
in, they will on the way get education, or other qualifications, as necessary to enter
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that sector.26
The endowment, a, determines each individual’s productivity in sector L,M and
H . We assume that each dimension of ability corresponds to one sector, such that
al ≡ a(1) denotes the individual’s efficiency units of labor in low-skilled services,
am ≡ a(2) in manufacturing, while ah ≡ a(3) denotes his efficiency units in high-
skilled services. Therefore the wage of an individual with a = (al, am, ah) efficiency
units of labor if working in sector J is ajωj . Given wage rates ωl, ωm, ωh per efficiency
unit of labor the optimal decision of any agent can be characterized as follows.
Result 1. Given unit wage rates ωl, ωm and ωh, the optimal sector choice of individuals can be







It is optimal for an individual with (al, am, ah) efficiency units of labor to work in






























Figure 4 shows this endogenous sorting behavior. The left panel shows that for a
given efficiency in high-skilled services, a0h, individuals who have relatively low effi-
ciency in both manufacturing and low-skilled services sort into H (the green horizon-
tally striped area), those with relatively higher efficiency in low-skilled services sort
into L (the blue dotted area), while those with relatively higher efficiency in manufac-
turing sort into M (the red vertically striped area). The middle and right panel show
26Given that high-skilled services is the most intensive sector in college educated workers, the in-
crease in college education that the US has witnessed over the last decades is in line with our model, as
it generates an increase in the demand for high-skilled services, providing a link from structural change


















































Figure 4: Optimal sector of work
This figure depicts the optimal sector of work choices as a function of ωl/ωm and ωh/ωm from three
perspectives. The left panel shows for a given a0h value the optimal sector choice for all {al, am} pairs.
The middle panel shows for a given a0m value the optimal sector choice for all {al, ah} pairs. The right
panel shows for a given a0l value the optimal sector choice for all {ah, am} pairs. The blue dotted areas
are where L is the optimal sector, the red vertically striped areas show where M is optimal, and the
green horizontally striped areas show where H is optimal.
the same for a given manufacturing and low-skilled service efficiency. The compar-
ative statics of optimal sorting with respect to changes in the relative unit wages is
straightforward.
The optimal sector of work choices of individuals determine the effective labor



































































ahf(al, am, ah)damdaldah. (9)
The effective labor supply in sector J is the total amount of sector J efficiency units,
aj , supplied to that sector. This is not measurable in the data, but we observe hours
worked, which corresponds to the raw labor supply, or employment share in the
model. These employment shares are the mass of individuals who supply their la-
20



































































f(al, am, ah)damdaldah. (12)
In a similar vein, ωl, ωm and ωh are the sectoral unit wages, which are in general also
not observed in the data, but sectoral average wages are. These are simply the total
earnings in a sector divided by the mass of people working in the sector, or equiv-





≡ ωjaj for j ∈ {L,M,H}. (13)
3.2.2 Demand for consumption goods and services
Household members derive utility from low-skilled services, manufacturing goods
and high-skilled services. The household allocates total income earned by household


















s.t. plCl + pmCm + phCh ≤ ωlNl + ωmNm + ωhNh
where u is any monotone increasing function, ωlLl+ωmNm+ωhNh are the total wages
of household members, pl, pm, and ph are the prices of the low-skilled services, the
manufacturing goods, and the high-skilled services.
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3.3 Competitive equilibrium and structural change







, prices {pl, pm, ph},
and consumption demands {Cl, Cm, Ch}, given productivities {Al, Am, Ah}, where in-
dividuals, households and firms make optimal decisions, and all markets clear.
Using goods market clearing in all sectors (Yj = Cj for j ∈ {L,M,H}), where the
supply is given by (2), and the market clearing unit wage rates, (3), in the household’s































The left hand side is the relative supply, while the right hand side is the relative de-
mand for low- and respectively high-skilled services compared to manufacturing. A
change in the relative productivity affects both the relative supply and the relative
demand.
An increase in relative manufacturing productivity compared to low-skilled ser-
vice productivity (Am/Al) has two direct effects: (i) it reduces the relative supply of
low-skilled services, (Yl/Ym), and (ii) through an increase in the relative price of low-
skilled services (pl/pm), it lowers the relative demand for low-skilled services. If low-
skilled services and manufacturing goods are complements, ε < 1, the effect through
relative prices is the weaker one, and relative supply falls by more than relative de-
mand. To restore equilibrium, the relative supply of low-skilled services has to in-
crease and/or its relative demand has to fall compared to manufacturing.
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In order for the relative supply to increase, the efficiency units of labor hired in
low-skilled services have to increase relative to manufacturing, which requires a rise
in the relative unit wage, ωl/ωm. At the same time, a rise in the relative unit wage also
increases the relative price of low-skilled services, thus lowering the relative demand.
Similarly, an increase in Am/Ah, through its effect on relative supply and relative de-
mand requires a rise in ωh/ωm.
Using the optimal sorting of individuals, (7), (8) and (9), we obtain the following


























































, and in turn
these fully characterize the equilibrium of the economy.
Proposition 1. When manufacturing goods and the two types of services are complements
(ε < 1), then faster productivity growth in manufacturing than in the two types of services
(dAm/Am > dAh/Ah = dAl/Al) leads to a change in the optimal sorting of individuals across
sectors. In particular ωl/ωm and ωh/ωm unambiguously increase, while ωl/ωh can rise or fall.
This results in an unambiguous increase in efficiency labor in L and in H , and a reduction in
efficiency and raw labor inM .
Proof. Total differentiation of (16) and (17). See Appendix B for details.
Proposition 1 confirms the results of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) in terms of effi-
ciency labor, rather than raw labor or employment shares: when sectoral outputs are
complements in consumption, effective labor inputs need to increase in the sectors
which become relatively less productive. As manufacturing productivity grows the
fastest, efficiency labor has to move out of manufacturing into both low- and high-
skilled services. Since individuals optimally sort into the sector with the highest re-
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turn for them, this implies that the equilibrium relative unit wages have to adjust.
Proposition 1 states what these adjustments entail. The adjustment to the new equi-
librium requires sector M to be squeezed from both sides, ωl/ωm and ωh/ωm have to
increase. This is very intuitive: sector M has to shrink, while sector L and H have to
expand, which requires sector M unit wages to fall both relative to sector H and sec-
tor L unit wages. This implies that in sector M not only efficiency units of labor, but
also the raw employment (share) falls, while the employment share of overall services
expands. It is worth to note that these results hold for any underlying distribution of
efficiency units of labor, f(al, am, ah). However, in general it is ambiguous whether the
boundary between L andH shifts up or down (ωl/ωh increases or decreases), and thus
also whether the employment share of both L and H increase. Since in general the
boundary between sector L and H changes, one of the sectors looses workers to the
other sector, which might imply that the employment share of one of the service sec-
tors falls. The effective employment of both service sectors unambiguously increases,
as their gain from sectorM always outweighs their potential loss to the other service
sector.
In terms of relative average wages, in general it is not possible to sign the changes
predicted by the model. The reason is self-selection; the workers leaving manufactur-
ing are the ones that have a relatively low efficiency. As a consequence, the average ef-
ficiency in manufacturing increases when its employment share decreases. This tends
to increase the average wage in manufacturing compared to the other sectors, offset-
ting to some extent the direct effect of the falling relative manufacturing unit wage.
Without further assumptions, it is conceivable that the indirect effect through the av-
erage efficiency might overturn the direct effect of changing unit wages. To see this,
consider the average low(high)-skilled service wage relative to the average manufac-















for j ∈ {L,H}.
From Proposition 1 we know that ωj/ωm increases. Due to the changing nature of self-
selection average efficiency inM increases, while in J it decreases, thus in general the
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change in average low(high)-skilled service wages relative to average manufacturing
wages is ambiguous. In general, the overall direction of change of the relative aver-
age wages depends on the exact form of the underlying distribution. We explore the
change in relative average wages in more detail in the quantitative analysis, and in all
our simulations the relative average wages (for both L and H toM ) move in the same
direction as the relative unit wages.
Since the structural change literature focuses on employment shares and value
added shares, we also investigate our model’s implications for relative value added.
We can show that relative sectoral value added shares increase in the sectors with
lower productivity growth if the sectoral outputs are complements in consumption.
Proposition 2. When manufacturing goods and the two types of services are complements
(ε < 1), then faster productivity growth in manufacturing than in the two types of services
(dAm/Am > dAh/Ah = dAl/Al), increases the relative value added in both high- and low-








These results can be understood by considering the following. In this model, sectoral
value added is equal to the sectoral wage bill: piYi = piAiNi = ωiNi. Proposition 1 tells
us for j ∈ {L,H} that ωj/ωm increases, that Nj increases, and Nm falls. Both relative
unit wages and effective labor changes increase the value added output of sector J
relative to sectorM .
The sectoral value added can be further expressed as piYi = ωiNi = wiLi, since the
sectoral wage bill can be expressed as either sectoral unit wage times sectoral efficiency
labor, or as sectoral average wage times sectoral raw labor. Using this latter expression









According to our model relative sectoral value added has to equal the product of rela-
tive sectoral average wages and relative sectoral employment shares. This result holds
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even if we include capital in the model, unless one assumes either imperfect capital
mobility across sectors, or different sectoral capital intensities. Since in the data the
relative sectoral value added does not equal the product of relative sectoral average
wages and employment shares, in our calibration we target relative average wages
and sectoral employment shares, as it is the evolution of these two measures that is
the focus of our paper.
4 Quantitative results
In this section we quantitatively assess the contribution of structural transformation to
the polarization of employment and wages across sectors. To do this we consider the
evolution of the competitive equilibrium in terms of employment shares and relative
average sectoral wages as productivity increases in manufacturing and in both low-
and high-skilled services. We calibrate our parameters to match key moments in 1960,
and then feed in the exogenous process for labor productivity to generate predictions
for the evolution of employment and wages. We choose 1960 as the starting point
for the quantitative evaluation of the model, because as documented in section 2.2 the
contraction of manufacturing employment is apparent in our data from 1960 onwards.
We first describe the data targets and the calibration strategy, and then discuss the
quantitative importance of our mechanism.
4.1 Calibration
Four of the key moments are calculated from the 1960 Census data. These are the




, and the sectoral employment shares, Ll,
Lm and Lh, which sum to one. Employment shares are calculated as share of hours
worked, and relative average wages are the sector premia, both as in section 2.2. The
fifth moment is the dispersion of the non-transitory component of log non-agricultural
wages, as in Lagakos and Waugh (2013), which we estimate from Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics (PSID) data from the years 1968–1975.27
27We rely on PSID panel data, as it is not possible to calculate this parameter in cross-sectional Census
data. We use data for the first 8 years which are available in the PSID, as we want to be as close to 1960
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All parameters are time-invariant, and the only exogenous change over time is la-
bor productivity growth. The following parameters need to be calibrated: the parame-
ters of the utility function θl, θm, θh, ε, the distribution of labor efficiencies, f(al, am, ah),
and the initial sectoral labor productivities, Al(0), Am(0), Ah(0).
We proceed in two steps. First, we calibrate the underlying distribution of labor
efficiencies under the assumption that the 1960 employment shares are met. Second,
given the distribution of labor efficiencies we calibrate the utility function and initial
productivity parameters to match the 1960 employment shares.
Themain idea behind the first step of the calibration is the following. For any given
distribution, f(al, am, ah), there is a unique pair of relative unit wages, {ωl/ωm, ωh/ωm},
which results in the employment shares observed in the data in 1960. These relative
unit wages in turn imply all the wages in the economy, including sectoral relative
average wages and overall wage dispersion. We calibrate the parameters of the distri-
bution to guarantee that if the observed employment shares are matched, then so are
the relative average wages in 1960 and the dispersion of log wages.
For the baseline calibration we assume that labor efficiencies are drawn from a
trivariate lognormal distribution. This assumption is not innocuous, but there are sev-
eral reasons that support this choice. First, the lognormal distribution is particularly
important in the selection literature (e.g. Roy (1951), Heckman and Sedlacek (1985),
Borjas (1987), Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008)). Second, empirical wage distributions
are skewed to the right and typically resemble a lognormal distribution. Assuming
that the underlying distribution of abilities is trivariate lognormal does not guarantee
that after selection the resulting one dimensional wage distribution is also going to
be lognormal. Nonetheless, under our parametrization the model generates a wage
distribution that resembles those we see in reality, in particular it has a long right tail.
Third, the trivariate lognormal distribution allows for a very flexible correlation struc-
ture, the quantitative effect of which we explore.
Without loss of generality we normalize the mean of al, am and ah to be unity.
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Given these assumptions, the six parameters of the variance-covariance matrix are left
as possible, and to have a large enough sample size. See Appendix C.1 for the details of this estimation.
28For the trivariate lognormal distribution numerical simulations show that the path of employment
shares and of relative average wages is independent from the level of these means.
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to be calibrated. Let σj denote the standard deviation of efficiency in sector J , and ρjk
the correlation between sector J and sector K efficiency. In our baseline calibration
we set all pairwise correlations between workers’ sectoral efficiencies to 0.3. For this
set of correlations – over which we conduct extensive robustness checks in section 4.3
– we calibrate the three variance parameters of the distribution to match the relative
average wages in 1960 and the dispersion of log wages.29
The parameters of the utility function and the initial labor productivities are left
to be calibrated. Previous literature has found a very low elasticity of substitution
between goods and services when output is measured in consumption value added
terms. Ngai and Pissarides (2008) find that plausible estimates are in the range (0, 0.3),
while Herrendorf et al. (2013) find a value of ε = 0.002. While neither these papers, nor
others in the literature, have estimated the elasticity for our sector classification, we
use ε = 0.002 in our baseline calibration, and conduct sensitivity analysis with respect
to this parameter. Of the remaining six parameters, θl, θm, θh and Al(0), Am(0), Ah(0)
only two ratios matter for the equilibrium of this economy, as can be seen from equa-



















match the unit wages in 1960 found in the first step of the calibration. The calibrated
parameters are summarized in Table 3.
It is well known that if individuals self-select based on their endowments of effi-
ciency units and one cannot observe these efficiency units, then the measurement of
changes in average wages or in labor productivity will be biased.30 In our model, ex-
panding sectors soak up, while contracting sectors shed relatively less efficient work-
ers. This implies that the average efficiency in manufacturing increases, while the av-
erage efficiency in low- and high-skilled services falls over time, which – if left uncor-
rected – leads to an overestimation of productivity growth in manufacturing relative
to both types of services.31 To understand the potential magnitude of this bias, we cor-
29We use sectoral log wage dispersion only to calibrate the variance-covariance matrix of the un-
derlying distribution of abilities. As our interest is in the evolution of employment shares and relative
average wages, we leave the analysis of the implications of structural change for overall and sectoral
wage dispersion for future work.
30Carneiro and Lee (2011) estimated the bias in the measurement of the skill premium, while Young
(2014) pointed this out in the context of measuring productivity growth differentials across sectors.
31This is true only when manufacturing employment is shrinking, and low- and high-skilled service
employment is expanding.
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Table 3: Calibrated Parameters
Description Value
ρlm correlation between L andM sector efficiency 0.3
ρlh correlation between L and H sector efficiency 0.3
ρmh correlation betweenM and H sector efficiency 0.3
σ2l variance of L sector efficiency 0.12
σ2m variance ofM sector efficiency 0.30
σ2h variance of H sector efficiency 0.35
ε CES b/w L,M and H in consumption 0.002
τl relative weight on L 0.54
τh relative weight on H 0.84
The correlation values are set at 0.3, and the elasticity of substitution, ε, is taken from the literature.
The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the sectoral employment shares, the relative average
wages, and the overall dispersion of wages.
rect for this selection effect, and report bothmeasured andmodel implied productivity
growth rates.
Similarly to Ngai and Petrongolo (2014) we measure labor productivity growth by
dividing the growth rate of industry level quantity indices from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) with the growth rate of industry level hours worked data from
the Census/ACS data, and aggregating it up to our three sectors. Our model output
can be written as Yj = AjNj = BjLj for each sector J , where Lj is the raw employ-
ment share (hours worked) and Bj the measured labor productivity, while Aj is the
true productivity in the model and Nj the efficiency units of labor. To account for the
difference between Nj and Lj – the selection effect – we compute the path of the Ajs
in the following way. Given the calibration of all of the fixed parameters of the model,
we find the path of Ajs such that the model implied growth in Bjs is equal to the labor
productivity growth measured in the data.
Table 4 shows in the first three columns the model implied, and in the last three
columns the measured average annual labor productivity growth in low-skilled ser-
vices, manufacturing and high-skilled services for each decade between 1960 and 2007,
as well as for the entire period. According to our calculations the growth of labor pro-
ductivity in manufacturing was higher than in either low- or high-skilled services in
each of the decades considered. Under our calibration, the bias in the relative produc-
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Table 4: Annual average labor productivity growth
Adjusted for selection Based on raw labor
Al Am Ah Bl Bm Bh
1960-1970 1.0077 1.0248 1.0132 1.0068 1.0279 1.0124
1970-1980 1.0095 1.0140 1.0116 1.0093 1.0148 1.0116
1980-1990 1.0051 1.0235 1.0108 1.0042 1.0270 1.0101
1990-2000 1.0265 1.0271 1.0120 1.0270 1.0286 1.0083
2000-2007 1.0072 1.0282 1.0162 1.0062 1.0320 1.0163
1960-2007 1.0113 1.0231 1.0125 1.0109 1.0258 1.0115
Labor productivity growth rates in the last three columns are calculated by dividing industry level
quantity indices from the BEA with industry level employment growth data taken from the Cen-
sus/ACS, and aggregating up to our three sectors. The first three columns give the path of model
productivity growth, which for our baseline calibration result in the same measured labor productivity
growth as in the data.
tivity differentials is small, but not negligible.32 It is worth to note that both produc-
tivity growth and the relative productivity growth across sectors varied significantly
decade by decade. For this reason, we evaluate the quantitative performance of the
model in two ways: (i) by plugging in the average annual growth rates for the entire
period; and (ii) by plugging in the decennial growth rates.
4.2 Wage and employment dynamics
To understand the strength of the mechanisms that we highlight, we simulate the com-
petitive equilibrium of the economy at different productivity levels. We fix the prefer-
ence and the sectoral efficiency distribution parameters at their calibrated values, and
feed in the labor productivity growth shown in Table 4. Our ultimate interest is the
endogenous path of employment shares and relative average wages.
Figure 5 plots the dynamics for our baseline calibration using average annual growth
rates over the period 1960-2007 adjusted for selection (bottom left numbers in Table 4).
The top left panel shows (in logs) the path of both the measured productivity (in the
data and the model) in dotted lines, and the model productivity in solid lines for all
three sectors. Since productivity growth is highest in the manufacturing sector, but
32Young (2014) finds that the implied bias might potentially be so large as to overturn the conven-
tional wisdom of faster productivity growth in manufacturing. However, with our calibration this is
not the case.
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Employment shares: data vs model








Relative average wages: data vs model
Figure 5: Transition of the benchmark model
The top left panel shows the observed average change in log labor productivity (dotted line) and model
productivity (solid line). The top right panel shows the endogenous response of the relative average
unit wages. The bottom left panel shows the predicted employment shares (solid line) and their actual
path (dashed line), while the bottom right panel shows the model predicted (solid line) and actual path
(dashed line) of the relative average sectoral wages.
manufactured goods and both types of services are complements in consumption, the
increased demand for the output of all sectors in equilibrium is met through a reallo-
cation of labor towards low- and high-skilled services, as we showed in Proposition 1.
33 The increased demand for labor in low- and high-skilled services puts an upward
pressure on the unit wages in these sectors relative to the unit wage in manufacturing,
which we plot in the top right panel. The bottom two panels show our model’s predic-
tions (solid lines) contrasted with the data (dashed lines) for our measures of interest.
Not surprisingly, the model matches the 1960 employment shares (bottom left panel)
and the 1960 relative average wages (bottom right panel) very well, as we targeted
33In Proposition 1 we assumed that productivity growth in the two types of services was equal. In
the quantitative evaluation of the model we relax this assumption and take productivity growth from
the data. Nonetheless, the results derived in the proposition hold in all our simulations.
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these measures. But the model also does well in predicting the paths of employment
shares and relative average wages after 1960. Our baseline model predicts at least 60
per cent of the change in the employment share of each sector.34
In our model the relative average wage changes are driven by changes in the rel-
ative unit wages and changes in the relative average sectoral labor efficiencies. As
discussed in section 3.3, these two effects, in general, go in opposite directions, how-
ever the direct effect of the unit wages typically dominates the indirect effect that it has
on average sectoral efficiencies. This is the case in our baseline calibration as well, and
our model overall predicts about 33 per cent of the growth in the relative low-skilled
service sector wages, and 59 percent of the growth in the relative average high-skilled
service sector wages compared to manufacturing.35
The path of employment shares and relative averagewages generated by themodel
are very smooth compared to the data. This is not surprising, as we assumed a con-
stant annual growth rate of sectoral labor productivity between 1960 and 2007. How-
ever, Table 4 reveals that the growth rates have varied substantially over time. Figure
6 shows the simulated model contrasted with the data when feeding in the model
productivity growth rates calculated for each period. The main difference in terms of
productivity growth rates is that the growth rate in low-skilled services is very low
in the initial decades, and it is very high between 1990 and 2000 when it is almost
the same as in manufacturing. Another important thing to note is that the growth
rate in high-skilled services is also quite high between 2000 and 2007. These changing
productivity differences imply that initially high-skilled service employment expands
more slowly, while low-skilled services expand more rapidly, and this pattern is re-
versed in 1990. While the model quantitatively does worse in the initial decades, the
overall predicted changes are the same.
As discussed in section 3.3, while our model qualitatively matches the changes in
expenditure shares, a model without capital intensity differences andwith perfect cap-
34In the data the percentage point change in the employment share of high-skilled services / manu-
facturing / low-skilled services are 12 / -20 / 8, in our model these numbers are 8 / -15 / 8 respectively.
35In the data the relative average wage of L and H compared to M workers increased by 14 and
respectively 21 per cent. In the simulation this is 8 per cent for L to M (25 per cent improvement in
relative unit wages and 13 per cent decline in relative average efficiency), and 7 per cent forH toM (28
per cent increase in relative unit wages and a more than 15 per cent drop in relative average efficiency).
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Employment shares: data vs model








Relative average wages: data vs model
Figure 6: Transition of the model with decennial growth
The panels show the path of the same variables as in Figure 5, except that we feed in the change in labor
productivity decade-by-decade, rather than the average for the entire period.
ital mobility across sectors cannot match the level of sectoral relative average wages,
employment and expenditure shares jointly. Figure 7 shows the relative value added
in low- and high-skilled services compared to the value added in manufacturing in
the model (solid line) and in the data (dashed line) for the time-invariant productivity
growth rates. The overall increase in high-skilled services relative to manufacturing
is replicated quite well, while for low-skilled services the model over predicts the in-
crease.36
36ForH toM these numbers are 125% in the data, and 112% in the model, and for L toM 38% in the
data and 120% in the model.
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Relative value added shares: data vs model
Figure 7: Transition of relative low- and high-skilled service value added
The graph shows the value added in low- and high-skilled services relative to manufacturing as pre-
dicted by the model (solid line) and in the data (dashed line).
4.3 Robustness checks
In our baseline calibration we assume that the correlation between any two of the
underlying sectoral efficiency draws is 0.3, that the underlying distribution of abilities
is trivariate lognormal, and that the elasticity of substitution in consumption is 0.002.
Before we analyze the sensitivity of our results to the these assumptions, we first show
that given our calibration strategy the model implied path of employment shares is
independent of the assumed correlations and the assumed underlying distribution of
abilities.
We calibrate the diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the distri-
bution, and a combination of the utility function parameters and of the initial model
productivities to match – among other targets – the employment shares in 1960. Thus,
by construction, in the initial period the model implied employment shares are the
same across all calibrations. Moreover, the model-implied path of employment shares
is independent of the underlying ability distribution. This is due to the way we correct
for selection effects in the measurement of sectoral productivity growth. In particular,
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the Ajs are such that – conditional on all fixed parameters – the model implied raw
labor productivity growth (Bj) is equal to that measured in the data. This implies
that the model implied growth in the Bjs is also the same across all calibrations. This
implies that as long as ε is the same across calibrations, the model implied path of
employment shares is also the same, as we show below.
Themodel implied labor productivity growth can directly be matched to the model
implied employment shares. To see how employment is allocated across sectors, con-



















s.t. Cjt = AjtNjt = BjtLjt for any j = L,M,H.
The social planner’s problem can be formulated either as choosing the efficiency units
of labor assigned to each sector given the Ajs or as choosing the employment shares
given the Bjs.



































for any t and j, k ∈ {L,M,H}.
The last equality makes use of the fact that for all distributions τl and τh are calibrated
such that the initial Ll, Lm and Lh are matched. This equation shows that given the
growth rate of the measured labor productivity, as long as ε is the same across calibra-
tions, the path of employment shares do not depend on the underlying distribution of
sectoral efficiencies. Therefore we only report the path of relative average wages when
conducting the sensitivity analysis with respect to the sectoral efficiency distribution.
Figure 8 summarizes the sensitivity of relative average wage paths to the assumed
correlation structure, along with Table 14 in Appendix C.2. While average wages rel-
ative to manufacturing increase in both the high- and the low-skilled service sector
37Note that the path of Ajs depends on the underlying distribution of abilities.
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Figure 8: Transition under different correlation structures
The graph shows the path of relative average wages for different correlation structures. The gray solid
line shows the data, the green lines show the average wage in high-skilled services relative to manufac-
turing, and the blue lines show the relative average wage of low-skilled services. The solid colored line
shows our baseline calibration, whereas the dotted line represent the path for a lower correlation (0),
and the dashed line for a higher correlation (0.6).
for all calibrations, the magnitude of these changes varies quite a bit. In Figure 8 the
top left panel shows the wages for our baseline calibration (solid lines), which features
a correlation of 0.3 between the underlying ability draws of any two sectors, along
with one where this correlation is 0 (dotted lines) and 0.6 (dashed lines). This graph
shows that while relative average high-skilled service wages increase a bit less when
the correlation is higher, the path of relative wages in low-skilled services is hardly
affected. Looking at the corresponding lines (top, middle bold and last) in Table 14,
we can see that the higher correlation we assume, the calibration requires a less dis-
persed underlying efficiency distribution. With a less dispersed and more correlated
distribution, the model predicts a smaller adjustment in the relative average sectoral
wages, as the model gets closer to the case of homogeneous labor (i.e. similar to Ngai
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and Pissarides (2007)). In the limiting case, where each individual is endowed with
the same amount of efficiency units of labor in all three sectors, there is no selection.
In order to have positive labor supply to all three sectors, unit wages have to be equal-
ized. As unit wages are equalized, individuals are indifferent between working in any
of the three sectors. Labor supply across sectors is random, average sectoral wages are
equalized, implying relative average wages are independent of the level of technology
in the economy. Thus it is not surprising that our model predicts smaller changes in
relative average wages when we assume higher correlations across all three pairs of
sectoral abilities.
In the other three panels of Figure 8 we show the relative average wage paths when
only modifying one of the baseline correlations to 0 (dotted) and 0.6 (dashed): in the
top right panel it is the correlation between sector L and M ability, in the bottom left
it is between M and H and in the bottom right it is between L and H . These graphs
show that in general the relative high-skilled service wages are more sensitive to the
correlation structure, but the differences in the relative average wage paths are not
large.
In our baseline calibration we assume that the underlying distribution of abilities
is trivariate lognormal. At the beginning of this section we showed that the path of
employment shares is independent of the assumed distribution of underlying abili-
ties. However, the quantitative – and potentially even the qualitative – predictions
regarding relative average wages are likely to be affected by not only the correlation
structure, but also the functional form of the distribution. We recalibrate the model as-
suming a normal distribution, truncated at zero for all three abilities, for the same set
of correlations as in Figure 8. As Table 15 in Appendix C.2 shows, our model predicts
much larger changes in relative average wages when assuming that the underlying ef-
ficiencies are drawn from a truncated normal distribution. The model overpredicts the
change in the relative low-skilled service wage by 35 to 79 per cent, while for relative
high-skilled services wages it predicts between 88 and 112 per cent of the change.
In our baseline calibration we use ε = 0.002 for the elasticity of substitution be-
tween goods and services (measured in value-added terms) as estimated by Herren-
dorf et al. (2013), which is at the lower end of estimates reported by Ngai and Pis-
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Figure 9: Transition under different elasticities of substitution
The graph shows the path of employment shares (left panel) and relative average wages (right panel)
for different elasticities of substitution, against the data. The gray solid line shows the data. The solid
colored lines show our baseline calibration (ε = 0.002), whereas the dotted lines represent the path for
ε = 0.02, and the dashed lines for ε = 0.2.
sarides (2008). To see whether our results are robust to higher, yet plausible, values
of this parameter, we explore how our results change when using ε = 0.02 or ε = 0.2,
naturally recalibrating the other parameters to match our five targets. Figure 9 shows
that qualitatively the transition paths look exactly the same. A higher elasticity of
substitution implies that the effective employment in low- and high-skilled services
have to increase less, and the effective employment in manufacturing has to fall less in
order to meet equilibrium demands. This in turn implies less adjustment in employ-
ment shares and in relative average wages. Increasing the value of the elasticity of
substitution takes the model’s predictions further away from the time paths observed
in the data. As can be seen in Figure 9 the transition paths look virtually the same for
ε = 0.002 and ε = 0.02, while for ε = 0.2 the model predicts less adjustment, but it does
reasonably well. This latter version of the model predicts 46 per cent of the increase in
L and 27 per cent of the increase in H sector average wages relative toM . In terms of
employment share changes, the model predicts at least half of the observed changes
between 1960 and 2007.
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4.4 Implications for occupational employment polarization
Even though our model is about sectoral labor market allocations, we can use it to cal-
culate the fraction of occupational employment share changes that it predicts. Fixing
the within-sector occupational employment shares at the 1960-2007 period’s average,
we can compute howmuch the sectoral labor reallocation – as predicted by our model
– would explain of the (between-sector) occupational employment share changes iden-
tified in the shift-share decomposition of section 2.3. Our model predicts 82 per cent
of the manual, 72 per cent of the routine, and 63 per cent of the abstract occupation’s
between-industry employment share changes. This is equivalent to 44 per cent of the
total manual, 24 per cent of the total routine, and 15 per cent of the total abstract em-
ployment share change. However, given that our model abstracts from occupational
differences within sectors, and thus by construction cannot explain any of the within-
industry changes in occupational employment, we think that the model explains a
quantitatively important fraction of total occupational employment share changes.
5 Conclusions
The literature on polarization of employment and wages has typically focused on oc-
cupations. We present a set of new empirical facts that suggest that in addition to
reallocations between occupations within industries, also shifts between industries
contribute to the polarization of labor markets. Moreover, we show that in terms of
broadly defined industries, polarization was present as early as 1950-1960 and directly
linked to the decline of manufacturing employment. Based on this evidence we pro-
pose a novel explanation, one based on structural change. A methodological contri-
bution of our paper is that we develop a multi-sector model with heterogeneous labor
in Roy-style fashion, the most parsimonious setup that yet allows heterogeneity in
wages. An insight from our model is that unbalanced technological progress does not
only lead to structural change, the reallocation of employment across sectors, but also
affects sectoral average wages. We find that higher productivity growth in manufac-
turing than in low- and high-skilled services increases employment and wages in both
39
the low-skilled and the high-skilled service sector, thus leading to the polarization of
the labor market. This simple model does remarkably well in predicting the sectoral
wage and employment patterns of the last 50 years.
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We use data from the US Census of 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and the Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS) of 2007, which we access from IPUMS-USA, provided
by Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder, and Sobek (2010). Following
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013) we restrict the sample to in-
dividuals who were in the labor force and of age 16 to 64 in the year preceding the
survey. We drop residents of institutional group quarters and unpaid family work-
ers. We also drop respondents with missing earnings or hours worked data and those
who work in agricultural occupations/industries or in the military. Our employment
measure is the product of weeks worked times usual number of hours per week.38 We
compute hourly wages as earnings divided by the product of usual hours and weeks
worked.
To construct the 30-year change graphs of Figure 1 and 10, and the 10-year change
graphs of Figure 11 we follow the methodology used in Autor et al. (2006)), Acemoglu
and Autor (2011), and Autor and Dorn (2013), which requires a balanced panel of
occupations. Dorn (2009) and Autor and Dorn (2013) provide a balanced panel of oc-
cupational classifications (‘occ1990dd’) over 1980-2008, which we use to construct a bal-
anced panel over 1950-2007 by aggregating occupational codes as needed. This leaves
us with 183 balanced occupational codes. Figures 1, 10, and 11 plot the smoothed
changes in average log hourly wages and total hours worked at each percentile of the
occupational skill distribution. These skill percentiles are constructed by ranking the
balanced occupations according to their 1950 (Figure 10 and top row of Figure 11) or
1980 mean hourly wages (Figure 1 and bottom row of Figure 11), and then splitting
them into 100 groups, each making up 1 percentile of 1950 or 1980 employment.
Figure 10 shows the change in log real hourly wages and employment, similarly as
Figure 1, with the difference that the ranking of occupations is based on their 1950 log
38Since in 1950 the Census did not include usual hours worked, we use hours worked last week
instead. In 1960 and 1970 the Census asked only for an interval of hours and weeks worked last year;
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Figure 10: Smoothed wage and employment polarization 1950 ranking
Notes: Data and left and right panel same as in Figure 1, except occupations are ranked based on their
1950 mean wages.
real hourly wage. The graph reinforces the message of Figure 1. The left panel shows
that wages have been polarizing from 1950 onwards, with the polarization most pro-
nounced in the earlier periods. The right panel shows that the polarization of employ-
ment is present in all 30-year periods starting from 1960, with the most pronounced
polarization between 1970-2000.
Figure 11 shows the wage and employment change of occupations for 10-year pe-
riods, with occupations ranked based on the 1950 wages (top row) and the 1980 wages
(bottom row). These graphs show that polarization does not happen on a decade-by-
decade basis. In some decades the top gains, while in others the bottom, but it is never
the middle-wage occupations that gain the most in terms of wages or employment.
In the text we document polarization in terms of occupations for 183 and 10 oc-
cupation categories (in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively), here we show it for an
even coarser classification. As in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we classify occupation
groups into the following categories: manual, routine, and abstract.39 Figure 12 shows
the patterns of polarization both in terms of wages and employment shares between
1950 and 2007 for these three broad categories. The right panel shows that the em-
ployment share of routine occupations has been falling, of abstract occupations has
been increasing since the 1950s, while of manual occupations, following a slight com-
39Acemoglu and Autor (2011) have a similar graph of the path of employment shares of four occu-
pation categories (abstract, routine cognitive, routine non-cognitive, manual) between 1960 and 2007.
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Figure 11: Smoothed wage and employment polarization, 10-year change
Notes: Data and left and right panel as in Figure 1. All panels show 10-year changes rather than 30-year
changes. Occupations are ranked based on their 1950 mean wages in the top two panels, and based on
their 1980 mean wages in the bottom two panels.
pression until 1960, has been steadily increasing. The left panel shows the path of the
relative average manual and abstract wage compared to the routine wage. It is worth
to note that, as expected, manual workers on average earn less than routine workers,
while abstract workers earn more. However, over time, the advantage of routine jobs
over manual jobs has been falling, and the advantage of abstract jobs over routine jobs
has been rising. Thus, the middle earning group, the routine workers, lost both in
terms of relative average wages and employment share to the benefit of manual and
abstract workers. In other words, also in terms of these three broad occupations there
is clear evidence for polarization.
A.1 Categorization of occupations
Following Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we classify occupations into three categories,
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Figure 12: Polarization for broad occupations
Notes: Relative average wages and employment shares (in terms of hours) are calculated from the same
data as in Figure 1. For details of the occupation classification see below.
- Manual (low-skilled non-routine): housekeeping, cleaning, protective service, food
prep and service, building, grounds cleaning, maintenance, personal appearance, recre-
ation and hospitality, child care workers, personal care, service, healthcare support;
- Routine: construction trades, extractive, machine operators, assemblers, inspectors,
mechanics and repairers, precision production, transportation and material moving
occupations, sales, administrative support;
- Abstract (skilled non-routine): managers, management related, professional specialty,
technicians and related support.
A.2 Categorization of industries
Based on our theory we classify the industries into three sectors, which are used in
Figure 3:
- Low-skilled services: personal services, entertainment, low-skilled transport (bus
service and urban transit, taxicab service, trucking service, warehousing and stor-
age, services incidental to transportation), low-skilled business and repair services
(automotive rental and leasing, automobile parking and carwashes, automotive re-
pair and related services, electrical repair shops, miscellaneous repair services), retail
trade, wholesale trade;
- Manufacturing: mining, construction, manufacturing;
- High-skilled services: professional and related services, finance, insurance and real
estate, communications, high-skilled business services (advertising, services to dwellings
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and other buildings, personnel supply services, computer and data processing ser-
vices, detective and protective services, business services not elsewhere classified),
communications, utilities, high-skilled transport (railroads, U.S. Postal Service, water
transportation, air transportation), public administration.
Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics for sectoral employment.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics by industry
low-skilled services manufacturing high-skilled services
1960 2007 1960 2007 1960 2007
Highschool Dropout 55.15% 10.45% 56.29% 13.34% 30.68% 2.60%
Highschool Graduate 29.43% 36.77% 27.19% 39.98% 30.82% 19.19%
Some College 11.09% 33.50% 9.86% 26.79% 16.94% 30.84%
College Degree 3.82% 14.88% 5.63% 14.42% 14.26% 27.86%
Postgraduate 0.51% 4.40% 1.03% 5.48% 7.29% 19.50%
Avg Yrs of Education 10.26 13.08 10.21 12.86 12.21 14.69
Female Share 33.13% 48.00% 18.66% 21.85% 38.09% 54.35%
Foreign-Born Share 6.23% 18.05% 6.63% 20.02% 5.04% 12.88%
A.3 Occupation and sector premia
Figures 3 and 12 as well as our quantitative exercise focuses on relative average resid-
ual wages. We obtain these by regressing log hourly wages on sector dummies and on
a set of controls, comprising of a polynomial in potential experience (defined as age -
years of schooling - 6), dummies for gender, race, and born abroad.
Table 6: Regression of log hourly wages: sector effects
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
low-sk. serv. -0.28∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
high-sk. serv. -0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 113635 459564 579290 958318 1094458 1235282 1308885
R2 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.19
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Regression of log hourly wages: occupation effects
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
manual -0.41∗∗∗ -0.42∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
abstract 0.17∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 113635 459564 579290 958318 1094458 1235282 1308885
R2 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Tables 6 and 7 show the regression results. Since we omit the dummy for manufac-
turing, the implied relative wage of a low-skilled (high-skilled) service worker is given
by the exponential of the estimated coefficient on the low-skilled (high-skilled) service
sector dummy. The regression specification to compute residual occupational wages
is analogue, with the sector dummies replaced by occupation dummies; we omit the
dummy for routine occupations, such that relative wages compared to routine occu-














1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
low-skilled services high-skilled services












1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
manual abstract
Relative residual wages compared to routine jobs
Figure 13: Wage polarization for sectors and occupations
Notes: Same data and classification as in Figure 3 and 12. The left panel shows the relative average
wages of high-skilled and low-skilled service workers compared to manufacturing workers. The right
panel shows the occupation premium for abstract and manual workers compared to routine workers,
and their 95% confidence intervals, as estimated in Table 7.
In the text we show the coefficients on the sectoral dummies from the wage regres-
sions, and in Figure 12 the relative average occupational wages. In Figure 13 we show
the reverse: the sectoral relative average wages compared to manufacturing, and the
coefficients on occupational dummies from a wage regression. The patterns are un-
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changed.
A.4 Alternative wage specifications
In the main text we document the patterns of average low-skilled and high-skilled ser-
vice wages relative to manufacturing by constructing the sector effects from a regres-
sion that controls for a set of observables, in order to remove effects stemming from
changes in the composition of the workforce. In particular, we include a fourth-order
polynomial in potential experience and dummies for gender, race, and foreign-born as
covariates in the (log) wage regression. In Table 8 we show how the predicted sectoral
relative wages change when adding further covariates to the regression and when re-
stricting the sample to only men.
The first three rows show the baseline specification’s prediction for sectoral relative
wages in 1960 and 2007 as well as their percentage change over this period. These are
the numbers against which we evaluate our quantitative model. In the rows below al-
ternative sets of further controls are included in the regression. While the quantitative
predictions naturally change, the patterns remain, showing an increase of low- and
high-skilled service wages relative to manufacturing.
51
Table 8: Predicted sectoral relative wages in alternative wage regressions
Sample additional controls year L toM H toM
all none 1960 0.731 1.021
2007 0.833 1.238
1960-2007 13.97% 21.16%
all interaction of sectoral dummies 1960 0.780 1.108
and experience 2007 0.887 1.350
1960-2007 13.77% 21.84%
all dummies for three occupational 1960 0.771 0.998
categories 2007 0.857 1.100
1960-2007 11.12% 10.20%
all dummies for ten occupational 1960 0.743 0.937
categories 2007 0.807 1.032
1960-2007 8.63% 10.11%
all dummy for college degree 1960 0.734 0.960
2007 0.832 1.057
1960-2007 13.34% 10.09%
men none 1960 0.7675 0.979
2007 0.850 1.274
1960-2007 10.75% 30.19%
men interaction of sectoral dummies 1960 0.788 1.032
and experience 2007 0.880 1.357
1960-2007 11.69% 31.52%
men dummies for three occupational 1960 0.776 0.953
categories 2007 0.872 1.114
1960-2007 12.41% 16.82%
men dummies for ten occupational 1960 0.748 0.919
categories 2007 0.836 1.062
1960-2007 11.78% 15.57%
men dummy for college degree 1960 0.774 0.921
2007 0.844 1.059
1960-2007 9.05% 14.95%
Notes: The first 3 rows show the baseline specification’s prediction for sectoral relative wages in 1960
and 2007 as well as their percentage change over this period. The subsequent blocks show the predic-
tions when including (alternatively) additional covariates: interaction terms of sectoral dummies and
experience, dummies for three occupational categories (manual, routine, abstract), dummies for ten oc-
cupational categories (as used in Figure 2), college dummy. The final set of rows show these predictions
when restricting the sample to only men.
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A.5 The role of gender and age composition changes
Figure 14 demonstrates that the sectoral employment share changes are not driven by
changes in the age, gender, race composition of the labor force. The counterfactual
industry employment shares are generated by fixing the sectoral employment share
of each age-gender-race cell at its 1960 level, and allowing the employment shares of
the cells to change. While it can be seen that the counterfactual employment shares
(the dashed lines) qualitatively move in the same direction as the actual employment
shares (the solid lines), in terms of magnitude the counterfactual employment shares
move much less. This implies that the changing composition of the labor force is not
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Figure 14: Counterfactual exercise: only changes in the gender-age composition of the
labor force
Notes: Employment shares (in terms of hours) are calculated from the same data as in Figure 3. The
actual data is shown as solid lines, while the dashed line show how the employment shares of industries
would have evolved if only the relative size of gender-age cells in the labor force had changed over time.
A.6 The role of industry shifts in occupational employment shares
In Table 1 of the main text we showed a shift-share decomposition for the changes
in occupational employment between 1950 and 2007, and alternatively between 1960
and 2007. In Table 9 we show this decomposition of employment share changes into
a between-industry and a within-industry component for each decade. While we find
a declining contribution of between-industry shifts since 1980, which might be due
routinization then taking off, again we find that a sizable part of the occupational
employment share changes is due to shifts between industries.
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Table 9: Decomposition of the changes in occupational employment shares by decade
1950–60 1960–70 1970–80 1980–90 1990–00 2000–07
3 occupations, 3 sectors
Manual
Total ∆ -2.71 -0.07 0.67 0.31 0.85 3.93
Between ∆ -0.94 0.55 0.47 0.95 0.47 0.44
Within ∆ -1.76 -0.63 0.21 -0.65 0.39 3.48
Routine
Total ∆ -0.65 -3.86 -3.09 -5.57 -5.24 -1.39
Between ∆ 0.94 -1.41 -1.22 -1.58 -0.98 -0.70
Within ∆ -1.59 -2.45 -1.86 -3.99 -4.26 -0.69
Abstract
Total ∆ 3.35 3.93 2.41 5.27 4.39 -2.54
Between ∆ 0.00 0.85 0.76 0.63 0.51 0.26
Within ∆ 3.35 3.08 1.66 4.63 3.87 -2.80
10 occupations, 11 industries
Manual
Total ∆ -2.71 -0.07 0.67 0.31 0.85 3.93
Between ∆ -1.51 0.71 0.73 1.16 0.78 0.67
Within ∆ -1.19 -0.78 -0.06 -0.85 0.07 3.26
Routine
Total ∆ -0.64 -3.86 -3.09 -5.57 -5.24 -1.39
Between ∆ 0.85 -2.39 -1.96 -2.21 -1.80 -1.02
Within ∆ -1.49 -1.47 -1.12 -3.36 -3.44 -0.36
Abstract
Total ∆ 3.35 3.93 2.41 5.27 4.39 -2.54
Between ∆ 0.67 1.69 1.23 1.05 1.02 0.36
Within ∆ 2.69 2.25 1.18 4.21 3.37 -2.90
Notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the change in
the share of employment (in terms of hours worked), the second the between-industry component, and
the third the within-industry component for the time interval given at the top. The top panel uses 3
occupations and 3 sectors, the bottom panel 10 occupations and 11 industries.
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As an alternative way to asses the importance of the employment reallocations be-
tween industries for the shifts in the broad occupation categories, we conduct the fol-
lowing counterfactual exercise: we fix the industry shares in employment (in terms
of hours worked) at their 1960 levels and let the within-industry share of occupa-
tions follow their actual path, and compute how the occupational shares would have
evolved in the absence of between-industry shifts. Figure 15 shows the resulting time
series (dashed) and the actual data (solid). This exercise shows that if there had been
only within-industry shifts, qualitatively the employment of the occupation categories
would have evolved as in the actual data, but that quantitatively they cannot explain
all of the changes. We therefore conclude that also between-industry shifts account for




























Figure 15: Counterfactual exercise: only-within industry shift of occupations
Notes: Employment shares (in terms of hours) are calculated from the same data as in Figure 13. The
actual data is shown as solid lines, while the dashed line show how the occupational employment
shares would have evolved in the absence of reallocations across industries.
A.7 Alternative shift-share decomposition
We also conduct an alternative shift-share decomposition, where we use industry level






where V Ait is the share of industry i in total value added in period t, and λoit is the
share of occupation o, industry i employment within industry i employment in period
t, as defined earlier. In general E˜ot 6= Eot, where Eot is simply the share of an occupa-
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tion o in total employment, and which is given by Eot = Lot/Lt =
∑
iEitλoit, where Eit
is the share of a industry i in total employment, as before.
Given these hybrid occupational employment shares, we can decompose their change
into a part that is driven by within industry occupational employment share changes,









V Ai∆λoit︸ ︷︷ ︸
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.
Table 10: Decomposition of changes in hybrid occupational employment shares
Constructed employment shares
1960–2007
3 x 3 10 x 11
Manual
Total ∆ 3.65 3.35
Between ∆ 1.32 0.98
Within ∆ 2.36 2.37
Routine
Total ∆ -19.53 -18.50
Between ∆ -5.29 -6.46
Within ∆ -14.24 -12.50
Abstract
Total ∆ 16.09 15.36
Between ∆ 4.18 5.69
Within ∆ 11.90 9.68
Notes: Same occupational employment share data as in Figure 1. The value added industry data come
from the BEA. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change, the second the
between-industry component, and the third the within-industry component over the period 1960-2007.
The first column uses 3 occupations and 3 sectors, column two uses 10 occupations and 11 industries
for the decomposition.
Table 10 shows the changes in our hybrid occupational employment shares and
their decomposition between 1960 and 2007, into a between-industry and a within-
industry component. The value added data comes from the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA). Due to the lack of value added data for finer industry categories before the
40The change driven by shifts between sectors is calculated as the weighted sum of the change in
sector i’s value added share,∆V Ait, where theweights are the average employment share of occupation
o within sector i, λoi = (λoit + λoi0)/2. The change driven by shifts within sectors is calculated as the
weighted sum of the change in occupation o’s share within sector i employment, ∆λoit, where the
weights are the average value added share of sector i, V Ai = (V Ait + V Ai0)/2.
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1960s, we decompose changes between 1960 and 2007. Table 10 suggests that between
one fourth and one third of occupational employment changes are driven by between
industry phenomena, regardless of whether we decompose 3 occupations in 3 sectors,
or 10 occupations in 11 sectors. The importance of the between-industry component
seems to be somewhat smaller than in the standard shift-share decomposition shown
in Table 1, but it is nonetheless quite a substantial share of the overall change.
A.8 Three-way decomposition of relative wage changes



















































where ∆ denotes the change between period 0 and t, and the variables without a time
subscript denote the average of the variable between period 0 and period t.
The first row is the decomposition we showed in the main body of the paper. The
second row gives exactly the same results in terms of the breakdown between industry
and occupation effects. The third row gives virtually the same results as summarized
in Table 11.
A.9 Decomposition of relative wage changes by decade
In Table 2 of the main text we showed a decomposition of changes in relative occu-
pational wages between 1950 and 2007, and alternatively between 1960 and 2007. In
Table 12 we show this decomposition of relative wages changes into an industry and
an occupation component for each decade.
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Table 11: Alternative decomposition of changes in relative occupational wages
Relative wages
3 x 3 10 x 11
1950–2007 1960–2007 1950–2007 1960–2007
Manual/Routine
Total ∆ 0.289 0.310 0.289 0.310
Industry ∆ 0.181 0.148 0.222 0.216
Occupation ∆ 0.107 0.162 0.067 0.094
Abstract/Routine
Total ∆ 0.327 0.240 0.327 0.240
Industry ∆ 0.310 0.254 0.381 0.323
Occupation ∆ 0.016 -0.013 -0.054 -0.082
Notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change,
the second the industry component, and the third the occupation component over the period 1950–2007
and over 1960–2007, based on the decomposition equation (20). The first two columns use 3 occupations
and 3 sectors, columns three and four 10 occupations and 11 industries.
Table 12: Decomposition of the changes in relative average wages by decade
1950–60 1960–70 1970–80 1980–90 1990–00 2000–07
3 occupations, 3 sectors
Manual/Routine
Total ∆ -0.022 0.085 0.023 0.033 0.036 0.134
Industry ∆ 0.024 0.061 -0.014 0.034 0.032 0.043
Occupation ∆ -0.046 0.024 0.037 -0.001 0.005 0.091
Abstract/Routine
Total ∆ 0.086 0.052 -0.077 0.107 0.083 0.076
Industry ∆ 0.061 0.052 -0.017 0.105 0.075 0.046
Occupation ∆ 0.025 -0.000 -0.060 0.002 0.008 0.029
10 occupations, 11 industries
Manual/Routine
Total ∆ -0.022 0.085 0.023 0.033 0.036 0.134
Industry ∆ -0.006 0.076 -0.022 0.042 0.045 0.065
Occupation ∆ -0.016 0.009 0.045 -0.010 -0.008 0.068
Abstract/Routine
Total ∆ 0.086 0.052 -0.077 0.107 0.083 0.076
Industry ∆ 0.065 0.067 -0.024 0.124 0.087 0.047
Occupation ∆ 0.021 -0.015 -0.054 -0.017 -0.004 0.029
Notes: Same data as in Figure 1. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change,
the second the industry component, and the third the occupation component for the time interval given
at the top, based on the decomposition equation (18). The top panel uses 3 occupations and 3 sectors,
the bottom panel 10 occupations and 11 industries.
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A.10 Historical data
Given that our model suggests that structural transformation leads to the employment
compression of occupations most intensively used in the shrinking sector of the econ-
omy, we look at pre-1950 data to see whether this prediction also holds over longer
horizons. There are some caveats to note. First, hours worked and wage data are not
available, so we can only look at employment patterns in terms of persons employed,
and we cannot analyze wage patterns. Given the lack of wage data, it is also hard
to verify whether these labor market patterns resemble polarization or have different
implications. Second, in the period 1850–1900 the Census used the 1880 occupational
classification system, where workers’ occupations were to some extent inferred from
their industry.41 This means that by construction there is a significant overlap between
industry and occupation classifications prior to 1900. With these caveats in mind, we
analyze the patterns of employment between 1850 and 1940. Since in the 1850s a large
fraction of the workforce was employed in agriculture, we do not drop agricultural













































Employment shares of industries
Figure 16: Employment patterns 1850–1940
Notes: The graphs is based on Census data between 1850 and 1940. Each worker is classified into one
of four occupations based on their occupation code (occ1950) and one of four sectors based on their
industry code (ind1950). Both graphs show employment shares in terms of number of people. The left
panel shows employment shares in terms of occupations, while the right panel shows them in terms of
sectors.
The employment share patterns are shown in Figure 16. This figure shows that the
41The IPUMS documentation writes: “In 1850–1900, occupations are classified according to the 1880
system. The 1880 occupational classification was oriented more to work settings and economic sectors – what is
now termed “industry” – than to workers’ specific technical functions.”
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defining trend in terms of sectors in the period 1850–1940 was the declining employ-
ment share of agriculture, and a slow increase in the other three sectors (low-skilled
services, manufacturing and high-skilled services). In terms of occupations we see a
parallel compression of agricultural occupations, a quite pronounced increase in rou-
tine workers, and a slow increase in manual and abstract workers. Thus even prior to
1950 we see quite a close connection between sectoral and occupational employment
share trends.
Next we conduct a shift-share decomposition of occupational employment shares
(as in section 2.3). This decomposition, summarized in Table 13, confirms what Fig-
ure 16 already suggests, that sectoral and occupational employment patterns are quite
closely connected. The decomposition shows that almost all of the decline in agricul-
tural occupations is driven by employment moving away from the agricultural sector;
that abstract and routine employment are expanding due to the movement of labor
into sectors where these occupations are used more intensively; and that manual em-
ployment is also partly expanding due to sectoral labor reallocation.
The historical data confirms that the structural transformation of the economy has
a significant impact on occupational employment patterns even prior to the 1950s. In
particular it seems that in the period 1850–1940 as the agricultural sector was shrink-
ing, while manufacturing and low-and high-skilled services were increasing, the em-
ployment share in agricultural occupations fell, while the employment share in routine
and abstract occupations increased, largely driven by the sectoral reallocation labor.
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Table 13: Shift-share decomposition of occupational employment share changes
4x4 12x14
1850–1900 1900–1940 1850–1940 1850–1900 1900-1940 1850-1940
Agricultural
Total ∆ -17.62 -23.43 -41.04 -38.57 -23.57 -68.61
Between ∆ -17.28 -22.61 -39.72 -21.49 -23.36 -53.23
Within ∆ -0.34 -0.81 -1.32 -17.08 -0.20 -15.37
Manual
Total ∆ 8.23 3.10 11.33 16.00 1.93 15.34
Between ∆ 2.48 2.42 4.13 6.25 1.21 6.03
Within ∆ 5.75 0.68 7.20 9.75 0.72 9.32
Routine
Total ∆ 7.21 16.74 23.95 4.49 20.96 26.30
Between ∆ 9.06 15.78 24.99 13.81 19.31 31.67
Within ∆ -1.86 0.97 -1.03 -9.32 1.65 -5.37
Abstract
Total ∆ 2.18 3.58 5.76 2.82 4.35 7.15
Between ∆ 5.73 4.42 10.61 6.63 7.67 15.28
Within ∆ -3.55 -0.84 -4.85 -3.81 -3.32 -8.13
Notes: Same data as in Figure 16. For each occupational category, the first row presents the total change,
the second the between industry component, and the third the within industry component over the
period 1850–1900, 1900–1940 and 1850–1940, based on the decomposition equation (1). The first three
columns use 4 occupations and 4 sectors (as in Figure 16), the last three 12 occupations and 14 industries
(same categories as in Table 1 with the following additional occupations:‘farmers and farm managers’,
‘farm laborers’, and industries: ‘agriculture’, ‘forestry’ and ‘fishing’).
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B Model appendix


















































A change in productivities triggers changes in the equilibrium cutoffs, âm and âh, in
























































we get the following expressions for the change in the effective and raw labor supplies






























































































































































































































































































































































where B3B2 + B1B4 > 0 can be easily verified by multiplying out the terms. Hence
to determine the response in âm and in âh, we only need to consider the sign of the
numerator. If D1 = D2 > 0, i.e. the growth rate of Al is equal to the growth rate of Ah,
















































As this shows, dâm
âm
> 0. The sign of dâh
âh


































To summarize the changes in relative unit wages, ωl/ωm = âm and ωh/ωm = âm/âh
increases, while ωl/ωh = âh can increase or decrease.




































































































































C Quantitative results appendix
C.1 Non-transitory wage dispersion in the PSID 1968–1975
To calibrate the distribution of labor efficiencies in the quantitative model, we target
as a fifth moment (besides relative average sectoral wages and employment shares
in the 1960 Census data) the variance of the non-transitory component of log wages,
which we estimate similarly to Lagakos and Waugh (2013). To compute this statistic,
we require panel data. We therefore use data from the PSID family index from its
launch in 1968 to 1975. To ensure that we are tracking individuals correctly over time,
we restrict the sample to households in which neither the household head nor the
spouse changes over this period. We restrict the sample further to individuals who are
between 16 and 65 years of age, employed outside of agriculture, report hourly wages
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that are not below the federal minimum wage, and whose wages are observed at least
twice over 1968–1975.
Like Lagakos and Waugh (2013), we want to extract the non-transitory components in
log wages to construct the calibration target for our model. We run a regression of log
hourly wages on individual fixed effects and year fixed effects, and then compute the
variance of the individual fixed effects. This gives a value of 0.187, which we use as
our target for the dispersion of the non-transitory component in log wages.
C.2 Robustness
In section 4.3 of the main text we summarized how our result change when assuming
a different underlying distribution of sectoral efficiencies and when varying the elas-
ticity of substitution between goods and services (measured in value-added terms).
Here we show in Table 14 and 15 the predictions of the model for various calibrations,
assuming a (trivariate) log-normal distribution or a truncated normal distribution re-
spectively.
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Table 14: Robustness checks: different correlations vs the data
parameters rel. avg. wage ∆






h τl τh L toM H toM
0.0 0 0.0 0.13 0.36 0.45 0.56 0.86 10.53 10.13
0.0 0 0.3 0.13 0.36 0.40 0.53 0.83 10.76 10.67
0.0 0 0.6 0.13 0.37 0.34 0.50 0.79 10.90 11.19
0.0 0.3 0.0 0.14 0.32 0.39 0.58 0.84 9.79 7.75
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.13 0.33 0.34 0.56 0.81 10.31 8.49
0.0 0.3 0.6 0.14 0.34 0.29 0.53 0.77 10.81 9.13
0.0 0.6 0.0 0.14 0.30 0.34 0.61 0.82 8.88 5.34
0.0 0.6 0.3 0.14 0.31 0.29 0.58 0.78 9.76 6.37
0.0 0.6 0.6 0.14 0.32 0.24 0.55 0.74 10.67 6.96
0.3 0 0.0 0.12 0.32 0.45 0.54 0.89 8.53 8.68
0.3 0 0.3 0.12 0.32 0.41 0.51 0.85 8.74 9.28
0.3 0 0.6 0.12 0.33 0.35 0.49 0.81 8.68 9.79
0.3 0.3 0.0 0.13 0.29 0.40 0.57 0.87 7.71 6.24
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.12 0.30 0.35 0.54 0.84 8.25 7.14
0.3 0.3 0.6 0.13 0.31 0.30 0.51 0.80 8.59 7.91
0.3 0.6 0.0 0.13 0.27 0.35 0.60 0.85 6.54 3.54
0.3 0.6 0.3 0.13 0.28 0.31 0.57 0.81 7.56 4.94
0.3 0.6 0.6 0.13 0.29 0.27 0.54 0.77 8.30 6.00
0.6 0 0.0 0.13 0.28 0.46 0.52 0.92 6.41 6.91
0.6 0 0.3 0.12 0.29 0.41 0.50 0.88 6.57 7.52
0.6 0 0.6 0.12 0.29 0.35 0.47 0.84 6.25 7.85
0.6 0.3 0.0 0.13 0.25 0.41 0.55 0.90 5.41 4.31
0.6 0.3 0.3 0.12 0.26 0.36 0.52 0.87 6.11 5.42
0.6 0.3 0.6 0.12 0.27 0.32 0.49 0.83 6.33 6.21
0.6 0.6 0.0 0.14 0.23 0.36 0.58 0.89 3.47 0.78
0.6 0.6 0.3 0.13 0.24 0.32 0.55 0.85 5.18 2.96
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.13 0.25 0.28 0.52 0.81 5.99 4.36
Data 14.00 21.17
Notes: This table shows the calibration of the lognormal distribution as described in section 4.1 for
all possible combinations of correlation structures where each correlation is from the {0, 0.3, 0.6} set.
The bold row in the middle shows our baseline calibration. The first three columns show the assumed
correlations, the next five the calibrated parameters, and the final two show the implied relative average
wage change of the low- and high-skilled service sector compared to manufacturing. The last row
contains the change in these same measures between 1960 and 2007 in the data.
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Table 15: Robustness checks: truncated normal distribution
parameters rel. avg. wage ∆






h τl τh L toM H toM
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.28 0.80 2.19 0.57 0.89 24.39 23.76
0.0 0.3 0.3 0.28 0.78 1.43 0.56 0.84 25.04 23.05
0.3 0.0 0.3 0.22 0.65 1.72 0.52 0.88 21.55 21.89
0.3 0.3 0.0 0.25 0.63 1.85 0.56 0.90 21.14 20.36
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.28 0.80 2.19 0.55 0.89 23.69 22.73
0.3 0.3 0.6 0.26 0.67 1.10 0.51 0.84 22.95 21.94
0.3 0.6 0.3 0.25 0.66 1.20 0.57 0.85 21.91 19.45
0.6 0.3 0.3 0.22 0.51 1.55 0.52 0.91 18.91 18.83
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.25 0.55 0.95 0.52 0.85 20.26 18.58
Data 14.00 21.17
Notes: This table shows the calibration of the truncated normal distribution as described in section
4.1 for nine correlation structures where each correlation is from the {0, 0.3, 0.6} set. The first three
columns show the assumed correlations, the next five the calibrated parameters, and the final two
show the implied relative average wage change of the low- and high-skilled service sector compared to
manufacturing. The last row contains the change in these same measures between 1960 and 2007 in the
data.
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